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The claim that fathers ‘‘swap’’ families when they
form new ones—that is, they shift allegiances from
nonresident children to new residential children
(e.g., Furstenberg, 1995)—has not been directly
evaluated empirically. Drawing on data from the
two waves of the National Survey of Families and
Households, we test Furstenberg’s argument in
terms of child-support transfers to nonresidential
children, and we also test an elaboration of his
approach that distinguishes between resident bi-
ological children and stepchildren. Using static-
score models, our findings indicate that fathers do
swap families but only when the trade-off is be-
tween new biological children living inside fa-
thers’ households and existing biological children
living outside fathers’ households. Even though
our analytic sample is small, our findings have
important implications for child well-being, child-
support policy, and the meaning of fatherhood.
From the perspective of children, families are in-
creasingly likely to be spread across more than
one household, with one biological parent, typi-
cally the father, living in a separate household. In
Department of Sociology, Bowling Green State University,
Bowling Green, OH 43403 (wmannin@opie.bgsu.edu).
*Department of Sociology and Population Studies Center,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48104.
Key Words: child support, divorce, fatherhood, nonresident
parenting.
1990, at least 22 million children—over one third
of all children—in the United States did not live
with their biological fathers, and about half of all
children are expected to live in a single-parent
family at some point before adulthood (Bumpass
& Sweet, 1989a; Norton & Miller, 1992). At the
same time, many fathers enter new unions, often
acquiring new biological children or stepchildren
(Sorensen, 1997).
These patterns raise a general question critical
to understanding both the well-being of children
and the meaning of fatherhood in the United
States: Do fathers reduce their social and econom-
ic investments in children from whom they live
apart as they take on new parenting roles? In this
paper, we focus on the economic dimension of this
question. Our aim is to test a notion suggested by
Furstenberg and colleagues that nonresident fa-
thers ‘‘swap’’ families (e.g., Furstenberg, 1995;
Furstenberg & Cherlin, 1991; Furstenberg, Nord,
Peterson, & Zill, 1983; Furstenberg & Spanier,
1984). Specifically, we examine whether fathers
reduce their child-support payments to nonresi-
dential children when they have new children. We
also elaborate Furstenberg’s theory by developing
and testing a hypothesis that distinguishes be-
tween new biological children and stepchildren.
Our focus on child support is important be-
cause social science research has shown that non-
residential father involvement benefits children,
and particularly that child-support payments from
nonresidential fathers positively affect children’s
outcomes above and beyond dollars from other
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sources (King, 1994; Knox & Bane, 1994; Mc-
Lanahan, Seltzer, Hanson, & Thomson, 1994).
Additionally, policy makers have recently focused
on child-support reform as a foundation for im-
proving the outcomes of children in the United
States. Understanding the impact of fathers’ new
family responsibilities is essential for this effort.
BACKGROUND
Patterns of father disengagement from nonresi-
dential biological children and the formation of
new families have been described in terms of
‘‘swapping’’ families (e.g., Furstenberg & Nord,
1985; Furstenberg & Spanier, 1984). The notion
is that fathers trade old parenting responsibilities
for new, with fatherhood being a transient state in
which parental obligations are dictated by resi-
dence (Furstenberg, 1988, 1995; Furstenberg &
Cherlin, 1991; Seltzer, 1991). The underlying idea
is that nonresident fathers face new demands
when forming new families, leading them to with-
draw their ties to nonresident children and to base
their economic and noneconomic investments
within their current households (Ihinger-Tallman
& Pasley, 1987). Furstenberg and Cherlin (1991,
p. 37) state, ‘‘When fathers invest in new family
responsibilities, such as having additional chil-
dren, the offspring from their first marriage some-
times get the short shrift.’’ A part of this process
may include showing allegiance to a new wife or
partner as well as new children.
Trading allegiances from old children to new
can be conceptualized in at least two ways. Defined
in terms of social involvement, the swapping hy-
pothesis has in fact received some support; past
research indicates that children are unlikely to have
both a biological father and stepfather socially in-
volved in their lives on a regular basis (Fursten-
berg, 1988; Mott, 1990; Seltzer & Bianchi, 1988).
Direct empirical evidence to corroborate Fursten-
berg’s theory in terms of the economic dimension
of nonresidential parenting is lacking. However,
Furstenberg’s hypothesis is commonly regarded as
true for all domains of father involvement, includ-
ing economic support. Given the association be-
tween children’s economic well-being, part of
which is determined by child support, and chil-
dren’s life chances, this issue deserves scrutiny.
Most child-support studies that take into account
fathers’ new family responsibilities have relied on
a rough proxy of fathers’ new parenting responsi-
bilities: fathers’ new marriages (Furstenberg, 1988;
Peters, Argys, Maccoby, & Mnookin, 1993; Seltzer,
1991; Sonenstein & Calhoun, 1992; Teachman,
1991; exceptions include Hill, 1992; Veum, 1993).
This is problematic for at least two reasons. First,
researchers have sometimes, because of data limi-
tations, used mothers’ reports of fathers’ new mar-
riages (McLanahan et al., 1994; Seltzer, 1991;
Teachman, 1991). However, mothers are not al-
ways reliable sources of information about fathers’
lives. Seltzer and Brandreth (1994), for example,
find significant differences in resident mothers’ and
nonresident fathers’ reports of fathers’ remarriages.
More important, remarriage is not an adequate
measure of new parenting responsibilities because
it does not distinguish the formation of new unions
from raising new children. To test Furstenberg’s hy-
pothesis, the needed measure is one that focuses on
children within and across households rather than
on ties to an adult via remarriage.
Two approaches have been applied to examine
nonresident fathers’ financial disengagement. One
approach uses mothers’ reports of child-support
levels paid at specific years since separation. This
work suggests that, as time since separation in-
creases, the levels of child support paid decline
(Seltzer, 1991; Teachman, 1991). However, this
work can only be considered suggestive, because
the aggregate comparisons do not permit analysis
of individual fathers’ changes in child support paid.
As a result, this type of analysis cannot assess the
factors associated with changes in child support
paid. The second approach uses longitudinal data
to examine changes in child support paid by non-
resident fathers. A study using relatively young
nonresident fathers (28–31 years old) from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth (Veum, 1993)
and another study, based on married couples from
the original 1968 sample of the Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics (PSID) (Hill, 1992), include co-
resident children primarily as a control variable and
do not explicitly test the swapping hypothesis.
These studies suggest that coresident children do
not influence changes in child support paid, but
they do not account for the biological relationship
of these children to the nonresident parent.
HYPOTHESES
Our first hypothesis is drawn from Furstenberg’s
premise that fathers trade parenting responsibili-
ties, withdrawing from nonresidential children
when they acquire new, coresidential children. As
Furstenberg et al. (1983) state, ‘‘Social parent-
hood takes precedence over biological parent-
hood’’ (p. 666).
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Hypothesis 1: The addition of new resident
children (i.e., either biological children or
stepchildren) lowers economic investments
in nonresidential, biological children.
We operationalize ‘‘economic investments’’ as
child support payments in our analyses because it
is the primary means by which nonresident par-
ents transfer income to their children. The emo-
tional and financial responsibilities resulting from
residing with children may interfere with fathers’
possible relationships with their nonresidential bi-
ological children. Nonresident fathers with new
families may perceive competing responsibilities
and loyalties across households (Clingempeel,
Coylar, & Hetherington, 1994; Ihinger-Tallman &
Pasley, 1987). It also may be easier and less
stressful from a father’s perspective to provide for
children who are sharing a residence with him
than to do so for children living in other house-
holds. Providing economic support often requires
contact with the child’s mother, sometimes caus-
ing strains that a father may wish to avoid (Adritti
& Kelly, 1994; Ahrons, 1993; Arendell, 1995;
Seltzer, McLanahan, & Hanson, 1998). Economic
theory also supports this hypothesis. Whereas fa-
thers can be certain that all of their economic in-
vestments in resident children are received by the
children, only a portion of the payment to mothers
for nonresident children may be received by the
children themselves. Thus, as fathers may face re-
duced incentives to pay child support (Weiss &
Willis, 1985), they may choose to invest in resi-
dent children and not in nonresident children.
Hypothesis 1 does not distinguish between new
biological children and stepchildren, reflecting Fur-
stenberg’s contention that coresidence is the critical
element determining fathers’ investments. In our
second hypothesis, we refine Furstenberg’s theory
by distinguishing between new biological children
and stepchildren. Conceptual arguments from eco-
nomics, evolutionary biology, and sociology imply
that nonresident fathers only raising stepchildren
will not swap family responsibilities; the trade-off
is between supporting biological children living in-
side and those outside their household.
Economist Gary Becker (1981), for example,
suggests that there is an important distinction be-
tween stepchildren and biological children. He ar-
gues that men invest more heavily in ‘‘marital-
specific capital’’—one type of which is biological
children with a new wife or partner—than in chil-
dren from a previous union. Because stepchildren
do not represent marital-specific capital according
to Becker, the implication is that their presence
will not influence fathers’ economic contributions
to biological children living elsewhere.
Evolutionary biologists take a different ap-
proach, but their argument leads to similar conclu-
sions. Trivers (1974) suggests that a conflict of in-
terest arises between parents and biological
offspring when investment in one child limits in-
vestment in future children. In response to such a
situation, fathers may divert resources from older
offspring to younger offspring when older off-
spring appear capable of surviving without their
fathers’ resources. In the human context, one signal
of capacity to survive might simply be that a child
lives with the mother and experiences a moderate
level of well-being. This argument does not apply
to stepchildren; it is only when the future offspring
are biological children that the trade-off occurs.
Finally, family sociologists argue that stepfam-
ilies are ‘‘incomplete institutions,’’ an arrange-
ment in which the roles (i.e., rights and obliga-
tions) of family members are not clearly defined
(Cherlin, 1978), especially as compared to first
marriages with only biological children. This im-
plies that fathers might not respond to the pres-
ence of stepchildren in their decision-making
about contributions to nonresidential children. The
following empirical evidence supports the distinc-
tion between stepchildren and biological children.
Fathers’ parenting of children differs depending
on the biological relationship to them (Marsiglio,
1992): stepchildren are more often excluded from
fathers’ lists of family constituents than are bio-
logical children (Furstenberg & Cherlin, 1991),
and nonresident fathers living only with biological
children report more benefits from parenthood
than nonresidential fathers living with stepchil-
dren (Seltzer & Brandreth, 1994).
Hypothesis 2: Only new biological children
lower fathers’ economic investments in
nonresidential, biological children; new res-
idential stepchildren have no effect on fa-
thers’ economic investments in nonresiden-
tial, biological children.
This hypothesis argues for separate effects in
a particular direction and is essentially an elabo-
ration of Hypothesis 1, not an alternative to it. For
example, the empirical results could support both
Hypothesis 1 and 2. This would suggest that, in
general, the mechanism driving the relationship
between coresident children and child-support
payments is coresident biological children, indi-
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cating the need for a substantive refinement of
Furstenberg’s theory. This would also be the case,
of course, if Hypothesis 2 is supported but Hy-
pothesis 1 is not, which would imply that col-
lapsing different kinds of new children into one




The National Survey of Families and Households
(NSFH) is a national probability sample of ap-
proximately 13,000 individuals. The first wave
(NSFH1) was conducted between 1987 and 1988.
The second wave (NSFH2) reinterviewed respon-
dents and was conducted between 1992 and 1994.
The response rate for the first wave of the NSFH
was 74%, and the follow-up response rate was
roughly 82% of the original sample (Sweet, Bum-
pass, & Call, 1989).
An important advantage of the NSFH is that it
directly asks respondents whether they have chil-
dren living outside the household. Other data
sources require indirect identification of nonresi-
dential fathers (e.g., Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation) or do not attempt to gather
information from nonresident fathers (e.g., Cur-
rent Population Survey). Another asset of the
NSFH is that we can infer causality because the
two waves of data collection allow us to conduct
dynamic analyses that link changes in child-sup-
port payments over time to changes in coresident
children. The NSFH is also suited to this project
because it contains rich data on many aspects of
family experiences, such as legal support arrange-
ments, income, residential histories, and marriage
and cohabitation histories.
The eligible sample was based on male main
respondents, who reported having an absent ‘‘fo-
cal’’ biological child less than 13 years old resid-
ing with his or her mother and who provided com-
plete child support information (n 5 298) in the
first wave. Ten percent of the sample was limited
because of missing child-support data. A focal
child was randomly selected among all absent
children less than age 18, and child-support ques-
tions referred to a focal child (and his or her co-
resident siblings), not to all sets of nonresidential
children. Because we focused on changes in child-
support payments across the waves, we also re-
stricted the sample to children less than age 13 at
the first wave, so that they remain eligible for
child support at the second wave. Fathers, in many
cases, did not owe support or pay for other ex-
penses when children reached age 18.
Our final analytical sample was restricted to
those fathers who met the above criteria and who
were also reinterviewed at the second wave; re-
mained nonresidential fathers of the same focal,
absent child at both waves; reported that the child
continued to live with his or her mother; and pro-
vided data on the amount of child support paid at
Wave 2. Of the 298 eligible nonresidential fathers,
213 were reinterviewed. Next, the sample was re-
duced to 170 to assure that the focal child re-
mained the same at both waves. A different focal
child was sometimes referenced in the second
wave, and there was no systematic reason for this
change. The sample was further limited to 155
cases in which the focal child continued to live
with his or her mother at Wave 2. We use this
criterion because child-support obligations change
if children move in with their fathers, other rela-
tives, or foster parents. Our last criterion was that
complete child-support information was provided.
The resulting sample contains 133 cases or only
about 45% of the cross-sectional sample. This may
be problematic for two reasons. The first is small
sample size. Although unfortunate, we believe that
the importance of the research aims, combined with
the strength of the dynamic analyses, outweigh res-
ervations about sample size. Our small sample size
will lower the statistical power of our estimates.
Another potential problem is clearly sample selec-
tivity. Fathers in our sample may differ in unmea-
sured ways from those that did not meet all criteria.
If this is so, parameter estimates of effects may be
biased (Heckman, 1979). We address this problem
in two ways. The first is simply by comparing the
distributions of independent variables of those
cases that meet all our criteria with those that do
not. Second, we estimate a sample selection model
that jointly predicts falling into our final sample
and child support. By allowing the error terms of
the two equations to be correlated, this model at-
tempts to adjust coefficients for potential observed
sample selectivity.
A final limitation of our sample and data is one
that plagues virtually all studies of nonresident fa-
thers. Fathers may either not be reporting all of
their absent children (Cherlin, Griffith, & McCar-
thy, 1983; Seltzer & Brandreth, 1994) or not par-
ticipating in the survey at all. Unfortunately, with-
out the use of administrative records, it is difficult
to assess the accuracy of fathers’ reports of non-
resident children. The likely direction of the bias is
that the nonresident fathers identified in our study
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have lived with their children, probably represent-
ing fathers with closer economic and social ties to
their children than the population of nonresident
fathers as a whole (Lin & Schaeffer, 1995; Schaef-
fer, Seltzer, & Kalwitter, 1991). Both underrepre-
sentation of nonresident fathers and underreporting
of their children remain unresolved problems for
research on fathers, and our selection models do
not account for these unobserved biases.
Measures
The dependent variable in our multivariate anal-
yses is the logged monthly amount of child sup-
port reported paid by the nonresidential father at
Wave 2. The measure includes payments to the
focal child and to his or her coresident siblings.
Some research suggests that nonresident fathers
and resident mothers report similar levels of child
support (Seltzer & Brandreth, 1994; Smock &
Manning, 1997), and fathers’ own reports of child
support paid are important to consider. Our mea-
sure of child support captures both formal and in-
formal payments. Including both types is impor-
tant because some fathers make payments to
nonresidential children without a child-support or-
der, or they pay more than the order (Seltzer,
1994). We control for child support paid at Wave
1 (measured in a similar manner to the Wave 2
variable), resulting in analyses that predict change
in child support paid. The child-support amounts
are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index to rep-
resent constant 1994 dollars.
To operationalize our hypotheses, our key in-
dependent variables concern new coresident chil-
dren. We construct the following variables: (a)
number of new coresident children; (b) number of
new coresident biological children (i.e., births be-
tween interviews); and (c) number of new step-
children acquired between interviews. A model
containing the first variable tests Hypothesis 1,
and a model containing the latter two, in lieu of
the first, tests Hypothesis 2. To test the second
hypothesis, we also include a control variable
measuring the number of biological children who
move into a father’s household between the two
waves; these are not the ‘‘new’’ children implicit
in the swapping hypothesis, but they need to be
taken into account.
Our other control variables are drawn from
past theory and research. Almost all are measured
as of the first wave of the survey and include char-
acteristics of the father and the focal child. The
only variable available in the first wave about the
mother was the father’s proxy report of her current
marital status; we have excluded this information
because of missing data and low expected reli-
ability (see Seltzer & Brandreth, 1994). Sociode-
mographic and economic characteristics of the fa-
ther include age, race, current union status,
educational attainment, and earnings. We measure
age of the father in years and anticipate that older
fathers have the economic resources to pay their
child support (Zill, 1996). Race is categorized
broadly into White and nonwhite because of sam-
ple size limitations. Prior work suggests that non-
white fathers are less likely to pay child support
than white fathers, partly because of differences
by race in the prevalence of nonmarital births
(Sorensen, 1997). The relationship between re-
marriage and child support varies in prior work
(e.g., Seltzer, 1991). Current union status is coded
‘‘1’’ if the father is either married or cohabiting
at Wave 1. We include both union types, because
a substantial minority of individuals, especially
among those who have been previously married,
enter cohabitations rather than remarriages (e.g.,
Bumpass & Sweet, 1989b). We code educational
attainment as a series of four dummy variables.
Studies indicate that fathers’ education is posi-
tively associated with child-support payments
(Braver, Fitzpatrick, & Bay, 1991; Veum, 1993).
A father’s economic situation is captured with his
earnings and is coded by dividing earnings by
10,000. Prior work indicates that earnings are pos-
itively associated with child-support levels (Brav-
er et al., 1991; Hill, 1992; Smock & Manning,
1997; Teachman 1991). We include a squared
term for earnings to test whether the variable earn-
ings has a nonlinear effect.
We also measure other aspects of fathers’ lives
that have been found to be related to child sup-
port. We include a dummy variable indicating
whether the father reports having a legal child-
support agreement. Legal agreements are associ-
ated with higher child-support payments (Seltzer,
1991). We also incorporate a measure of whether
the father ever lived with the focal child, because
residence with the child may create stronger ties
to the child and thus be associated with higher
levels of payments (Seltzer, 1991). Finally, we in-
clude a measure of the years since the father and
child last coresided. Past research indicates that
longer durations since coresidence have a negative
impact on levels of child support payments (Selt-
zer, 1991). Fathers who never lived with their
child are assigned the value of the age of the child.
The focal child variables include age, sex, dis-
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tance from the father’s current residence, and the
number of coresident siblings of the focal child.
Older children have been found to be more likely
to receive payments than younger children (Fur-
stenberg & Harris, 1992; Seltzer, 1991). Age of
the focal child is coded in years. We include the
gender of the focal child as well, although past
research yields mixed results about the effects of
this variable (Furstenberg et al., 1983; Paasch &
Teachman, 1993; Seltzer, 1991; Seltzer & Bianchi,
1988). Distance between the child’s and father’s
residences is coded as a continuous variable in
miles. Previous research indicates that the greater
the physical distance, the lower the likelihood of
financial payments (Seltzer, 1991; Sonenstein &
Calhoun, 1990). We include the squared value of
distance to test whether distance has a nonlinear
effect. Finally, we include a measure of the num-
ber of full siblings less than age 18 living in the
focal child’s household. This is an important vari-
able because the number of siblings will be related
to the amount of child support owed by the father.
Generally, the greater the number of children, the
larger the child-support obligation. We include
number of siblings at both Wave 1 and Wave 2 to
allow us to control for child-support obligations
at both interview waves.
Analysis
We conduct multivariate analyses using maximum-
likelihood tobit models to analyze changes in child
support. We use tobits rather than ordinary least
squares, because the dependent variable is quite
skewed, due to a substantial proportion of fathers
who report that they pay no child support. Tobit
estimation assumes that independent variables have
both linear and nonlinear effects and produces con-
sistent estimates of coefficients and standard errors.
We employ static-score models to predict changes
in child-support payments across the two waves
(Finkel, 1995; Kessler & Greenberg, 1981). The
static-score model includes a lagged endogenous
version of the dependent variable. In the current
application, the lagged variable is the logged
monthly child support paid at Wave 1.
Because of the possible selectivity of our sam-
ple, we estimate a sample selection model to ac-
count for observed selection. It jointly estimates
two equations: a probit predicting whether a case
is included in our sample and a tobit model pre-
dicting change in child support. The probit equa-
tion uses all potentially eligible cases (n 5 298)
and predicts cases included in our sample (n 5
133). The correlation between the equations
shows the direction and magnitude of nonrandom
associations between sample status and changes in
child support. If a model that assumes the corre-
lation is zero fits the data well, then our single-
equation estimates are unbiased. We estimate the
model using maximum likelihood in HOTZTRAN
(R. Avery & J. Hotz, unpublished data).
Our analytic strategy is as follows. We estimate
models to test each of the two hypotheses. The
first model in each case is a baseline model that
only includes increases in coresident children,
along with important controls (child support paid
at Wave 1, number of coresident children at Wave
1, and number of the focal child’s siblings at both
waves). Given our sample size constraints, we
then determine whether each of the control vari-
ables separately contributes to the fit of the model.
We assess the goodness of fit by conducting log-
likelihood ratio tests. To test the first hypothesis,
we evaluate whether increases in the overall num-
ber of coresident children reduce child support
payments. A negative and significant coefficient
for the increase in coresident children would be
consistent with the notion that fathers swap fam-
ilies. To test the second hypothesis, we distinguish
between coresident stepchildren and biological
children, evaluating whether increases in stepchil-
dren or biological children reduce child support.
If the coefficient for increase in stepchildren is
insignificant and the coefficient for increase in
new biological children is significant and nega-
tive, then we accept Hypothesis 2.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows that two fifths of nonresidential fa-
thers coreside with other children at Wave 2, in-
dicating that a substantial percentage of nonresi-
dential fathers are potentially economically
responsible for at least two households. Nearly
one quarter are residing with two or more chil-
dren. The next column shows that three tenths of
nonresident fathers are coresiding with biological
children, and the final column indicates that 15%
are coresiding with stepchildren. Further analysis
confirms that remarriage is a poor proxy for non-
resident fathers’ family responsibilities. Approxi-
mately two fifths (41%) of men living in unions
at Wave 2 (39% in formal marriages and 48% in
informal unions) are not coresiding with any chil-
dren, whereas 7% of nonresidential fathers not in
117Swapping Families




































Note: Weighted percentages and unweighted n’s (n 5
133).
Source: National Survey of Families and Households,
Waves 1 and 2.















Note: At Wave 1, 75.0% of fathers paid child support,
with a mean monthly amount paid of $235.46; at Wave 2,
77.2% of fathers paid, with a mean monthly amount of
$276.21. All amounts are converted to 1994 dollars, and
weighted values are reported. n 5 133.
Source: National Survey of Families and Households,
Waves 1 and 2.
unions are raising a child in their household (re-
sults not shown).
Table 1 also shows the percentage of nonresi-
dent fathers who at Wave 2 are residing with new
children (i.e., men who are living with children at
Wave 2 with whom they were not living at Wave
1). A considerable share of men coreside with new
children at Wave 2; almost one third (31.5%) of
nonresident fathers live with new coresident chil-
dren at Wave 2, and the majority live with only
one additional child. The next column shows that
nearly one quarter (22%) of nonresident fathers
coreside with new biological children at Wave 2,
and the final column indicates that one tenth are
coresiding with new stepchildren.
On average, about three quarters of nonresiden-
tial fathers in our sample report paying at least
some child support at Wave 1 and at Wave 2 (Table
2). This percentage is somewhat higher than that
reported from other data sources, such as Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) (Sor-
ensen, 1997) and PSID (Smock & Manning, 1997),
but similar to other work using the NSFH (Meyer,
1998; Seltzer & Brandreth, 1994). The mean
monthly payment of child support at Wave 1 was
$235 (in 1994 dollars), and the median payment
was $166 per month. The mean amount of child
support reported paid at Wave 2 ($276) is slightly
higher than at Wave 1. These numbers are also
quite consistent with those based on mothers’ re-
ports from the U.S. Census Bureau (1993). In 1991,
mothers with a support order who received any
child support received on average $3,011 per year.
A comparable sample from our data is based on
nonresident fathers at Wave 1 who have legal sup-
port agreements and make some child support pay-
ments; fathers in this group report paying on av-
erage $3,066 per year (in 1991 dollars).
Table 2 also shows changes in payments by
nonresident fathers across interviews. Changes in
amounts paid can be the result of changing child-
support obligations (e.g., changes in the number
of children owed support) or changing decisions
by fathers about how much they would like to
pay. The vast majority of fathers (85%) shifted
their monthly child support payments, with slight-
ly greater percentages increasing than decreasing
their child-support payments. Overall, the average
changes in child support paid were positive, with
an increase of $41 per month (results not shown).
The average decline in payments was lower than
the average gain in child-support payments be-
tween the interviews. If we limit changes to what
may be considered substantial (plus or minus $50
per month), then we find that one quarter (27%)
of nonresidential fathers paid at least $50 less per
month at Wave 2 than at Wave 1, and 38% of
nonresidential fathers paid at least $50 more at
Wave 2 than at Wave 1 (results not shown). The
fathers who did not alter their payments were
those who paid nothing at both interview waves.
It is notable that a considerable share of fathers
continued to support their children and often in-
creased the level of payments. The increases ap-
pear to stem largely from ‘‘other support,’’ which
may in part reflect responses to increased financial
needs of children in their adolescent years. If
child-support payments alone are considered, the
increases are much more modest.
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for the
variables used in our multivariate analyses. The
first few rows provide information about the core
independent variables. The mean increase in cores-
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TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable Value
Number of new coresident children (mean)
All children
Biological children: births
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Earnings (mean, in 1994 dollars) $20,217


















Distance from father (mean, in
increments of 100 miles) 5.51
Number of full siblings in focal child’s
residence, Wave 1 (mean) 0.6
Number of full siblings in focal child’s
residence, Wave 2 (mean) 0.2
Note: Weighted percentages and unweighted n’s (n 5
133).
Source: National Survey of Families and Households,
Waves 1 and 2.
ident children is .52, and most of this is due to new
biological children. The mean increase of biologi-
cal children who move into their fathers’ house-
holds between the waves is quite small (.06). The
mean number of coresident children at Wave 1 is
.54, and the mean values for biological children
and for stepchildren are .30 and .25, respectively.
Fathers are on average 32 years old, and 72%
of them are white. Almost half of them are living
in a union at Wave 1 (30% in marital and 18% in
cohabiting unions). The majority of fathers have
at least 12 years of education, with only about
20% having less than 12 years of education. Mean
earnings are $20,217 per year. Also, the majority
of fathers (72%) lived with the focal child at some
point and report having a legal child support
agreement (73%). The mean number of years
since separation from the child is 4.5 years. The
average amount of child support the fathers report
paying per month at Wave 1 is $235.
Regarding the focal child, mean age at Wave
1 is almost 7 years, and slightly over half of the
focal children are female. The focal child and fa-
ther live on average 551 miles from one another,
although the median is a much lower 20 miles.
The mean number of additional children the father
supports in the focal child’s household (i.e., full
siblings of the focal child) decreases as siblings
age out of their status as minors.
Multivariate Results
Table 4 shows results from the static-score mod-
els. The table presents two models: the first model
tests Hypothesis 1 (Model 1), and a second model
tests Hypothesis 2 (Model 2). The coefficients are
tobit estimates of the effects of variables on the
logged monthly payments to nonresidential chil-
dren made at the second wave of the survey. The
only control variable that contributes to the fit of
our model is distance between residences of the
nonresident father and his child.
The results for Model 1 indicate that new co-
resident children generally do not affect changes
in child-support payments. The coefficient mea-
suring the number of new children is statistically
insignificant. Not surprisingly, even when we in-
clude all of the control variables, the effects of
number of new children are about the same (re-
sults not shown). As expected, the amount of child
support paid at Wave 1 has a statistically signifi-
cant, positive effect on child support paid at Wave
2, but the number of coresident children at Wave
1 and nonresident children at Wave 2 does not
significantly influence levels of child support paid
at Wave 2. Our findings lead us to reject Hypoth-
esis 1: New resident children do not lower eco-
nomic investments in nonresidential children.
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TABLE 4. TOBIT ESTIMATES OF CHANGE IN RESIDENT CHILDREN ON MONTHLY CHILD SUPPORT PAID AT WAVE 2
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Number of new coresident children
Coresident children
Biological children: births













Child support paid Wave 1












Log likelihood 2263.1 2261.1
*p , .10. **p # .05. ***p # .01.
Source: National Survey of Families and Households, Waves 1 and 2. n 5 133.
Model 2 distinguishes between biological chil-
dren and stepchildren. The coefficient for the num-
ber of additional biological children across the
waves is negative and statistically significant at the
.01 level. Nonresident fathers who had new chil-
dren between the interview waves paid significant-
ly less child support than those who experienced
no change in the number of coresident biological
children. The coefficient for the increase in step-
children, on the other hand, does not approach sta-
tistical significance. Introducing each control vari-
able separately does not increase the fit of the
model; one important exception is distance between
the nonresident father’s and the child’s residence.
Distance does statistically contribute to the fit of
the model at the p 5 .10 level; fathers living farther
away pay less support than fathers who live closer.
In any case, whether we include each control vari-
able separately or the full array of control variables
together, our initial pattern of findings does not
change. Based on this evidence, we accept Hy-
pothesis 2: The addition of children reduces child
support to nonresidential children only when the
new children are biological children.
Finally, we find little evidence of observed sam-
ple selectivity. First, the distributions of variables
are fairly similar across samples (data not shown).
The final analytical sample has a significantly
greater percentage of female focal children, White
nonresident fathers, and fathers with legal child-
support agreements than the percentage of fathers
who were excluded from the sample. The sample
selection model results indicate no evidence of se-
lectivity, conditional on observed characteristics
(Appendix Table 1). The rho representing the cor-
relation between the error terms of the two equa-
tions is statistically insignificant, and a model re-
stricting the correlation to be zero fits the data as
well as the unrestricted model ( p 5 1.00). Also,
the effects of the independent variables maintain
similar levels of significance and magnitude.
DISCUSSION
In part as a response to changes in family patterns
over recent years, the issue of fatherhood and its
meaning has become a focus of much theoretical
and empirical attention from social scientists. Our
paper addresses a question with critical implica-
tions for these issues. We evaluate Frank Fursten-
berg’s notion that fathers swap old children for new
and whether social parenthood, defined by cores-
idence, takes precedence over biological parent-
hood. We focus on the economic dimension of al-
legiances to nonresidential children, namely child
support. We conclude that Furstenberg is right, with
one caveat: Fathers do ‘‘swap’’ families, but only
when the trade-off is between new biological chil-
dren living inside versus existing biological chil-
dren living outside the fathers’ households. Fathers
do not appear to actually swap children, because
on average, they continue to financially support
nonresident children. These results are inconsistent
with the notion that social parenthood, at least as
defined by coresidence, takes general precedence
over biological parenthood. Instead, biological par-
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enthood, when combined with coresidence, appears
to take precedence. However, we must interpret
these results somewhat tentatively because of our
limited sample size.
An important potential concern is that our find-
ings could be an artifact of official modifications
in child-support orders due to fathers’ new family
responsibilities. We do not believe that this is the
case. First, the majority of states have no guidelines
that take into account ‘‘subsequent’’ families, and
only 13 states have mandatory guidelines of this
sort (Takas, 1991). Second, there is wide variation
in the application of the guidelines (Office of Child
Support Enforcement [OCSE], 1996). Third, and
most important, empirical findings show that only
a small proportion of award modifications are in
fact due to changes in nonresidential fathers’ family
situations (OCSE, 1996).
Our contribution to policy dialogues about child
support is that fathers appear to be adjusting their
child support payments, probably often informally,
to accommodate the demands of new biological
children. Indeed, fathers themselves report being
concerned about whether and how their new fam-
ilies can influence child-support awards (OCSE,
1996). If a primary goal of child-support policy is
to ensure compliance, our findings would suggest
that policies need to explicitly resolve the issue of
award modification when fathers have new chil-
dren. Of course, this issue is a difficult one to re-
solve, because it engages the question of which
children should take precedence (e.g., Takas, 1991).
There are several limitations of our work. An
obvious one is that our sample is quite small. De-
spite this shortcoming, our findings are robust to
alternative specifications of the model, increasing
our confidence in the findings. Nonetheless, our
study ought to be replicated on larger samples
when appropriate data are available, allowing for
evaluations of differences in fathering for racial-
ethnic and socioeconomic groups. Second, our
data do not allow us to assess nonresident fathers’
motivations for adjusting their child-support pay-
ments. Thus, for example, we cannot discern
whether fathers feel an erosion in their commit-
ment to their nonresident children with the arrival
of a new child, whether they are responding to the
financial constraints they face when they begin
supporting another family, or whether they are re-
acting to some other set of factors. It is critical to
build upon our analyses and existing qualitative
work (e.g., Arendell, 1995) by empirically eval-
uating the reasons for fathers’ decisions to modify
their financial support to nonresidential children.
Third, we lack information about complex family
situations. Our data only allow us to examine
child-support payments to a focal child and his or
her coresident siblings; some fathers have more
than one set of biological children living outside
their households. Fourth, other changes in fathers’
and mothers’ circumstance may create shifts in
child-support payments. Our focus here is on test-
ing a specific hypothesis about new children. A
more rich data source should be employed to ex-
amine the influence of other factors.
Finally, our data very likely underreport non-
residential fatherhood. An inherent problem in this
project is the selectivity based on unobserved
characteristics of nonresident fathers. Currently,
however, no national data set can make the claim
of having a representative sample of nonresiden-
tial fathers. Although innovative efforts have been
made to make adjustments via indirect estimation
methods (e.g., Garfinkel, McLanahan, & Hanson,
1998; Sorensen, 1997), these still are not ideal,
and better sampling and data on fathers have be-
come top research priorities (National Institute for
Child and Health Development, 1996).
Nonetheless, our work is unique in being, to
our knowledge, the first to empirically evaluate
the effects of resident children, whether step or
biological, on economic investments in nonresi-
dential children. Despite the small sample size, we
believe three broad implications of our study de-
serve special emphasis. First, future efforts aimed
at understanding the nature of nonresident father–
child ties, or fatherhood more generally, ought to
widen their scope to incorporate both resident and
nonresident offspring. Second, fathers in this sam-
ple often maintain financial ties to their children
and in some cases increase their investments in
nonresident children, further efforts should be em-
ployed to identify the mechanisms under which
fathers maintain economic investments in their
nonresident children. The third implication emerg-
es from our finding that fathers’ financial support
for nonresident children appears to be conditional
on their future fertility. Ultimately, this is a pattern
that probably does not bode well for children’s
well-being in the United States, particularly given
a societal context of increasing nonmarital fertility
and union instability. Researchers should continue
to pursue work on fathering as efforts to encour-
age father involvement are continually emerging
and may result in new fathering dynamics.
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